This paper aims to test the relevance of political and institutional variables in explaining revenue and expenditure budget forecast errors. The results, based on aggregate expenditure and revenue data, sug gest that the estimates are driven by the causality of expenditure forecast errors on revenue forecast errors and vice versa, which makes it impossible to disentangle the direction of the causality. The re sults also indicate that public sector debt, as well as some other institutional variables, plays a role in explaining forecast errors. The robustness of the coefficients depend on whether estimates are based on aggregate values rather than on budget items.
Introduction
The economic downturn that started in 2007 led to the introduction of mechanisms aimed at controlling budget deviations in some Eurozone countries. These mechanisms set in place through the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact, introduced deficit targets, among other restrictions, to be achieved by a country's public authorities as a whole within a specific timeframe.
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It must be noted that overall deficit targets are set for all tiers of government. This is relevant in countries with a federal structure where there are different levels of government whose fiscal budgets affect the aggregate fiscal deficit. Different coexisting tiers of govern ment and their heterogeneity, both from an ideological and fiscal perspective, give rise to a series of difficulties that must be addressed by all public administrations.
Spain's central government (CG) strengthened the existing fiscal rules, aimed at reduc ing the budget deficit at a regional and local level, as well as its own budget deficit. The new procedures were focused on forcing regional parliaments and local administrations to pass fiscal budgets able to meet certain deficit targets and on controlling the "execution/realiza tion" of the public budget (at period t). The available data suggests that such procedures did not succeed in their goal because most autonomous communities (ACs) did not meet their fiscal targets during the period 2008-2014. We argue that this failure to meet the deficit tar gets might be because the new fiscal rules did not take into account budget forecasts (at pe riod t-1) and budget execution procedures (at period t). In addition to that, it must be remar ket that fiscal rules are defined in terms of National Accounts (NA from now on) and that their translation in budgetary terms is not straightforward.
We suggest that the fiscal rules that have been introduced in Spain in recent years do not suffice in curbing fiscal deficits because they do not contemplate the process via which budg ets are drawn up. We argue that the fiscal rules' current design allows for and fosters strategic behaviors by ACs aimed at circumventing the said rules. In addition, we also contend that current financing agreements between CG and the ACs reinforce the said strategic behaviors.
With regard to the financing agreements that regulate the ACs' degree of tax autonomy and public transfers from CG to regional governments (RGs), although Spain's devolution process is said to have led to one of the most decentralized regimes in western countries, this is not true in terms of tax autonomy. In Spain, there are big constraints on RGs' fiscal pow ers that prevent them from altering shared taxes (in particular VAT and excise taxes) as well as, to a lesser extent, Income Tax. Furthermore, some taxes that are considered to be AC tax instruments have big restrictions on them. The key factor to be analyzed is who estimates tax revenues and transfers at period t-1 for collection/delivery at period t, and what mechanism is used to correct possible deviation. In Spain, CG forecasts revenues from shared taxes and ACs forecast them for their own taxes, with significant repercussions on AC budget forecasts and behaviors.
Another relevant aspect to take into consideration is the fact that, in Spain, the distribu tion of deficit targets is not the result of a bargaining process, but the outcome of a unilat eral decision by CG (see section 3.2 for a more detailed description of this process). Given that the deficit target for each country relates to all levels of government as a whole, the bigger the deficit assigned to subnational governments, the lower the remaining deficit target for CG. This means that CG effectively decides which level of government will bear the burden of the budget cuts. In addition, CG spreads the deficit target linearly across Spain's regions, or at least it has done since 2012. This means that all regions are expected to meet In contrast, in our estimates we take into account interactions between CG and the ACs and also among the ACs themselves, based on the Spanish economy for the period 1994 2013. In addition, our estimates are run based on budget items rather than on budget aggre gates.
The results suggest that estimates based on aggregate expenditure and revenue budget data are driven by the causality of expenditure forecast errors on revenue forecast errors and vice versa, which makes it difficult to disentangle the direction of the causality and makes the role of the other variables almost irrelevant. In addition to that, we must take into account that budget forecasts errors are clearly influenced AC's growth rates. Finally, we find that when the Central Government overestimates national economic growth this has a negative impact on expenditure forecast errors and a positive impact on revenue forecast errors (meaning larger revenue forecast errors). Meanwhile, previous deficit/surplus seems not to be relevant.
The results also indicate that public sector debt plays a role in explaining forecast errors. This variable is significant when the estimates relate to the aggregate budget or to budget items separately. However, the sign of this relationship is different if we refer to expenditure or revenue forecast errors. It can be inferred that the ACs use their public sectors to circum vent tough fiscal rules imposed by CG.
As for the importance of institutional and political variables, the results point to the fact that they play no role when aggregate expenditure and revenue forecast errors are estimated. Nevertheless, tax autonomy, the ideological concurrence of governments at different levels, the governing parties' political orientation and per capita revenue from financing agreements have some explanatory power when the estimates are run using budget items as a basis. This suggests that ACs' budget managers may use budget forecasts to balance policy needs 88 xisco oliver rullán and joan rosselló villalonga against the fiscal rules and that they behave strategically using the electoral calendar, tax autonomy and budget rules at their convenience. The strategic use of budget techniques to circumvent fiscal rules is facilitated by the ACs' soft legislation on budget procedures (see section 4.2 on ACs' legislation affecting budget execution).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature relating to our research. Section 3 provides an outline of Spanish data relating to forecast errors during the period under analysis. In section 4, we refer to the determinants of AC budget forecasts and we give a brief description of the Spanish decentralization process and mechanism used by CG to distribute fiscal resources at subnational levels of government. In section 5, we outline the methodology and variables used in our estimates. Finally, section 6 and 7 contain the results and our conclusions.
Related literature
Numerous analyses can be found of the relationship between fiscal deficits and fiscal federalism issues. There are contributions concerning the existence of coordination-cooper ation mechanisms between federal and RGs, the role of RGs in the law-making process, or the default-bailout game or the role of soft budget constraints (Von Hagen and Eichengreen, 1996; Wildasin, 1997; Goodspeed, 2002; Rodden, Eskeland and Litvack, 2003; Von Hagen, 2005; Bordignon, 2006; Von Hagen, 2006; and Hallerber, Strauch and von Hagen, 2007, among others) . However, none of them has analyzed the role of fiscal budgets as instruments by the public authorities to implement their policies in a framework where there are fiscal rules that condition aggregate fiscal deficits.
The issue of budget forecast techniques has been analyzed extensively (Plesko, 1988; Gentry, 1989; Holden and Peel, 1990; Baguestani and McNown, 1992; Mocan and Azad, 1995; Auerbach, 1996; Auerbach, 1999; Leal et al., 2008, and Jinping and Lynch, 2008, among others) , but most of the contributions do not analyze the institutional determinants of budget forecast errors.
In recent years, since the Stability and Growth Pact, there has been a growing number of papers that analyze the role of fiscal rules, budget forecasts and their determinants in the EU zone, etc. (Strauch, et al., 2004; Jonung and Larch, 2006; Brück and Stephan, 2006; Beetsma, Giuliodori and Wierts, 2009; Christodoulakis and Mamatzakis, 2009; Pina, 2009; Pina and Venes, 2011; Beetsma et al., 2013; Merola and Pérez, 2012; and Martins and Cor reia, 2013, among others) . Nevertheless, their main shortcoming, from the perspective of fiscal federalism, is that their analysis is based on macroeconomic national aggregates and they overlook the role played by subnational governments and their interactions with na tional authorities (shared taxes, intergovernmental transfers, expenditure on shared responsi bilities etc.), even though, in some countries, they account for over 50% of the total ex penditure. In this paper, we try to fill this gap.
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The Determinants of Regional Budget Forecast Errors in Federal Economies: Spain 1995 -2013 Mention should be made to some studies based on Spanish data that analyze the relationship between fiscal balances, the public debt, fiscal rules and financing agreements, etc. (García-Milà and McGuire, 1990; Monasterio and Suárez-Pandiello, 1993; Lago-Peñas, 2005; Sorribas-Na varro, 2011; Argimon and Hernández de Cos, 2012; Hernández de Cos and Pérez, 2013; Pérez and Cucarella, 2013; Mussons, 2013; López and Leal, 2015; and Delgado-Téllez, Lledó and Pérez, 2017, among others) . However, none of the previous articles deals with budget forecast issues.
Finally, other studies (Pons and Solé, 2001; Argimón and Martí, 2006; Leal and Pérez, 2009; and Fernández-Caballero, Pedregal and Pérez, 2012) analyze public budgets in Spain and, in particular, their deviations. Nevertheless, they do so from a descriptive and time-se ries-based perspective, avoiding an analysis of causality.
Our empirical analysis is based on Brück and Stephan (2006) , who analyze the political, electoral and institutional determinants of the quality of budget deficit forecasts across Eu rozone countries. They review the literature that analyses political cycles (including political business cycles, electoral cycles, partisan cycles and institutional cycles), studying their impact on budget forecast errors. We adapt their approach to a framework in which subna tional governments and their interactions with central government are considered.
Following Rodden (2002) , Rodden (2006) , Foremny (2014) and Molina-Parra and Mar tínez (2015) , who find that vertical fiscal imbalances do have a positive effect on subna tional governments' deficits, we argue that Spanish ACs' subnational fiscal deficits are influ enced by the decisions of Spain's CG. We identify different mechanisms that are implemented by the CG to influence subnational fiscal deficits: i) it decides on the distribu tion of deficit targets among the ACs and itself, and so it decides who will bear the burden of budget adjustments, ii) it decides unilaterally subnational governments' deficit targets, traditionally setting them linearly (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) but also in a discretionary way in 2013 (ap parently depending on the real deficit in 2012) and, iii) the CG estimates unilaterally the amount of resources that ACs will receive. Therefore, as suggested by relevant data, CG might underestimate these resources, which will be adjusted at period t+2. This would allow CG to transfer part of its fiscal deficit to its RGs.
Lastly, our estimates are run using budget items as a basis, rather than budget aggregates.
Descriptive analysis of Budget forecast errors by Spanish Autonomous Communities
In this section, we analyze data relating to budget forecast errors by Spanish ACs during the period 1994-2013.
In Figures 1 and 2 , we present the evolution of forecast errors (total revenues and total expenditure) for each region 1 . From these graphs, it can be observed that forecast errors were fairly frequent for most ACs during 1994-2013. Nevertheless, this data does not offer an insight into the size of the errors. In order to analyze the magnitude of the budget forecast errors, we first separate positive deviations from negative ones and, second, we compute the median relative 2 deviation for each region for both the positive and negative values. In a symmetric distribution, the mean is equivalent to the median. However, our data has very asymmetric distributions. We use the median instead of the mean because there are some extreme observations that have a sig nificant effect on the mean. Given that the median is less sensitive to extreme values, it provides us with a better idea of the magnitude of the deviations.
In Figures 3 and 4 , we show the results. For each region, there are two bars, one along the positive axis and the other along the negative axis. This reflects the median of the positive It is important to stress that budgetary items are affected by the position of each re gional economy in the cycle as well as by discretionary actions by regional governments. In spite of this consideration, which is analyzed in the empirical section of the paper, the analysis of aggregate data provides some interesting hints.
From the perspective of public expenditure, positive and negative forecast errors with values above 5% can be observed in most expenditure items. It is interesting to note that the forecast errors in interest payments, public investment and capital transfers are mostly posi tive, meaning that they are overestimated. On the one hand, positive forecast errors in public investment and capital transfers might be due to the fact that they are associated with invest ment projects that are very often subject to significant delays due to delays in their execution or in their sources of financing when they are provided by other administrations. On the other hand, forecast errors in interest payments could be accounted for in two possible ways. First, treasury budget managers might anticipate potential increases in interest rates that do not occur; second, given that interest payments are rarely subject to parliamentary control, these resources could be redirected to other budget items because they are under the exclusive control of treasury budget managers. Finally, it is important to add that the forecast errors in debt payments are rather low (mostly below 5%), and that the highest values correspond to outliers.
As for the revenue forecasts, first of all unexpected forecast errors in both current and capital transfers must be noted which are mainly overestimated. This is surprising because most of them are transfers from Central Government, and these transfers should be approved in its budget, which is passed before AC budgets. Second, significant forecast errors in rev enues from borrowing must be highlighted, mostly with a negative sign, which means that the real borrowing exceeds the borrowing envisaged in the budget. This deviation might be explained by the fact that borrowing operations authorized at period t become effective at period t+1. Finally, direct taxation and revenues from fees have mainly been underestimated. (These revenues are basically under AC control, except for those generated by income tax). Meanwhile, there are big forecast errors, far higher 10%, in revenues from indirect taxation estimated by CG (although most of these revenues are associated to shared taxes such as VAT and Excise taxes where CG and AC estimates must coincide, there is a small portion of rev enues that are obtained from own taxes and their estimates are subject to volatility and fore cast budget errors by AC).
To sum up, budget forecast errors are not an exception and they are rather high. This calls for an analysis of the factors that explain them.
The determinants of Autonomous Community budget forecasts
In this section, before a description is given of our empirical analysis, we explore some issues that should offer an insight into budget forecast errors and that will be tested in the empirical section, when data is available.
Fiscal Rules
Spanish autonomous communities (ACs) and local governments (LGs) are empowered to take on debt within certain limits. The basic rule is that debt repayment and interest cannot exceed 25% of the ACs' and LGs' current revenues. In addition to this, authorization from CG is required to arrange credit operations abroad and for debt issuance. Nevertheless, credit operations with national banks and short-term credit operations (less than one year) do not require such authorization.
In general, these rules have been implemented and achieved since the very beginning of the Spanish decentralization process. Data indicates that during the period 1992-2015 for all ACs (422 observations) the rule has not been achieved in 25 occasions (1,2%) only, 0 occasions between 2002 and 2010 and 5 occasions between 1992 and 2001 (corres ponding to 3 different regions), which suggests that the restriction is basically non binding.
The rules governing AC budget balances have undergone changes over different periods. Initially, from 1992 to 2001, the budget deficits and debt assigned by CG to each AC were based on bilateral negotiations covering a two-year period (these agreements were known as Budgetary Consolidation Scenarios).
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During the second period, from 2001 to 2005, under the Budget Stability Act (BSA), CG imposed a single budget deficit target on all ACs, although the general rule was that they had to achieve a scenario of budget stability. No individual targets were set for each region and so they had the same deficit target regardless of their cyclical position.
In 2006 reforms were made to the BSA under which CG and the ACs could adapt their deficits and surplus targets to their economy's cyclical position. Hence, budget surpluses were to be achieved if the economy's growth rate exceeded 2% and deficits were allowed if the economy's growth rate was below 0%. The allocation of deficit targets to CG and the ACs -and to LGs-was unilaterally decided by CG. Again, it is important to remind that the same deficit target was assigned to all ACs, regardless of the region's economic position; meaning that the real deficit targets differed significantly from one AC to another because the mecha nism that allocates fiscal revenues to the ACs leads to significant asymmetries across regions (López-Casasnovas and Rosselló, 2014) , irrespective of the evolution of the ACs' tax base.
Finally, we must remark that the 2012 new Budget Stability Law introduced structural budget balance, expenditure and debt rules at the regional level. The new regulation refined rules-based monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to prevent, correct, and penalize de viations from fiscal rules and targets introduced in the 2006 regulation.
We should also point out that since the implementation of the BSA, the ACs have de manded a different system for distributing deficit targets across CG, the ACs and LGs, based on a real bargaining process at different levels of government. In addition to this, they have called for deficit targets to be asymmetrically allocated to the different ACs. CG has rejected all these proposals, arguing that it would be impossible to distribute the deficit targets in a way that satisfied all ACs and LGs.
Exceptionally, in 2013, CG agreed to the possibility of assigning individual short-term budget deficit targets. However, the allocation of these deficit targets to the ACs was not based on any legal regulation 3 . Again, it was unilaterally decided by CG, based apparently on the AC budget deficit at t-1. This situation was exceptional and it did not occur during the period 2014-2016. What is more, uniform long-term budget deficit targets continue to be applied and all the ACs must present balanced budgets by 2020, they must achieve a limited amount of debt relative to GDP by 2020 (13%), and every year the budget is subject to restrictions concerning its variations, in addition to the achievement of fiscal deficit targets, always in terms of National Accounts.
From the perspective of budget forecasts, it must be reminded that budget deficit targets have sometimes been changed several times during the same fiscal year, with obvi ous repercussions on budget forecast errors. In addition, very often CG has taken unilat eral decisions that impact on expenditure by the ACs, clearly distorting their budget forecasts.
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Legislation affecting budget execution
The budget is the instrument with which the executive body presents the legislature with an estimation of the public policies that it plans to put into practice, together with their cost and the financial resources that are going to be collected from citizens. It is thus the legisla ture that finally accepts or rejects the allocation of public revenues, based on defined ex penditure policies, and who authorizes the taxes that citizens will pay. This means that it is the legislature that finally accepts or rejects the government's budget forecasts.
Given that budgets are an estimation of income and expenditures, some flexibility in their management can be expected. All countries have their own regulatory system for deter mining the balance of power between their legislative and executive bodies. In particular, these regulations determine the executive body's degree of autonomy in managing its budget.
In general, in countries where there is a clear distinction between legislative and execu tive powers, its legislative body has tight control over any modification that might entail transfers between budget items or that might lead to increasing public expenditure (i.e. the USA). In contrast, this control is laxer in countries whose executive body is elected by a majority of its legislature. In such countries, the legislation that affects budget control might seem very tight but it is not really the case because budgetary rules are so flexible that they allow for increases in public expenditure and big changes in budget items without the legis lature's ex-ante authorization (e.g. UK, Spain, Italy, etc.).
All in all, this flexibility allows the executive body to alter its initial budgetary estimates to the point that the initial budget forecast becomes irrelevant. Among other things, this flex ibility is due to the fact that the evolution of expenditure is not conditional upon the evolution of tax revenues; public expenditure can be raised without guaranteeing the necessary finance; some budget items can be approved without considering the real evolution of these items in the past, meaning that they are clearly underestimated; transfers from other public institu tions can be budgeted for without any legal backup from the said institutions, etc.
Although it would be interesting to introduce a variable that captured to which extent the executive takes advantage of the required flexibility when managing the budget, it is impor tant that the reader understands that norms regulating budget execution as well as fiscal rules are subject to interpretation, especially when we refer to budget forecasts rather than budget execution.
Financing agreements
In this section we provide some insights into the characteristics of the financing agree ments between CG and the ACs which might have an impact on AC budget forecasts. 98 xisco oliver rullán and joan rosselló villalonga
Increasing tax autonomy
The first point to note regarding the Spanish decentralization process is that there is a substantial degree of asymmetry in the origin of AC fiscal revenues, with a clear impact on budget forecasts. There are two different groups of regions. On the one hand, there are two regions (known as 'regiones forales') that collect 4 the most tax revenues (even if they are shared with CG) and they transfer some financial resources to CG to cover services pro vided by the Spanish government in these regions. On the other, there are all the remaining ACs, which receive transfers (direct transfers or transfers from shared taxes) in order to finance the provision of public goods and services devolved from CG over the last 30 years. ACs in this group also obtain some revenues from their own taxes (which are often managed by CG).
These financing agreements have been changed several times since the first financing mechanism, agreed upon in 1987. These agreements have evolved as follows:
Firstly, apparently there has been a significant increase in fiscal co-responsibility for two reasons: i) because the mechanism has shifted from a transfer-based process to shared taxa tion, ii) because the ACs have increased their regulatory power over income tax, which is a shared tax, and over some of the transferred taxes considered own taxes. As a result, their tax autonomy seems to have gradually risen.
However, some aspects of the mechanism distort real tax autonomy. CG has tradition ally opposed the creation of new taxes by the ACs, even if they do not overlap with CG taxes and even if the ACs have the legal capacity to create and regulate them. In addition to this, the ACs cannot manage or regulate shared taxes. For instance, under the 2009 agreement, the ACs shared income tax (50%), VAT (50%) and excise duties (58%) with CG, but without any possibility of regulating or managing VAT or excise duties.
Second, the distribution of financial resources among the regions is apparently based on an objective estimation of their needs. However, various different equalization payments are also made with the result that there is no coherent method to the final allocation of resources in terms of any sort of needs assessment of the regions or their fiscal capacity or income levels (see López-Casasnovas and Rosselló, 2014) . In particular, one of the inter-territorial compensation funds is very sensitive to the ACs' relative positions in terms of revenues, which means that it is very unlikely for revenues from the fund to be accurately forecasted.
Estimation of revenues from taxes shared with Central Government
So far, we have described the main characteristics of financing agreements very suc cinctly. Nevertheless, all of the agreements contain some technicalities that have a significant effect on ACs' revenues, in particular since 2001.
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The Determinants of Regional Budget Forecast Errors in Federal Economies: Spain 1995 -2013 This technicality relates to how CG calculates the financial resources from shared taxes and transfers that will be transferred to the ACs. CG estimates the revenues from shared taxes and transfers at t-1 and notifies the ACs of these estimates by October t-1. The ACs must approve their public budgets for year t by December of year t-1, which means that they must know the tax revenues from their own and shared taxes and transfers from CG by October (t-1). It is important to note that CG will transfer all the estimated resources during period t, regardless of whether the calculations were correct or not. Then, at period t+2, once the real revenues are known, CG compensates the ACs for the difference (or vice versa).
There should apparently be no forecast errors in transfers and revenues from shared taxes. Budget forecast errors due to revenue miscalculations should only affect estimates based on own taxes. However, as we mentioned before, the budgetary rules do not prevent regional parliaments from approving a budget that takes into account some revenues not previously confirmed by CG.
In addition to this, the ACs have no access to how revenues are forecasted by CG. The data shown in Table 1 suggests that a significant amount of the reduction in CG's fiscal deficit in 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 might have been accomplished by underestimating the advance payments to the ACs (equivalent to approximately 0.40% of the GDP each year). One could argue that these deviations are due to unpredictable errors; on the contrary, they might be due to CG's strategic behavior. Unfortunately, no variables can be introduced in order to separate both effects from an empirical perspective. In any case, we introduce to which extent CG fiscal deficit can affect RG's budget forecast errors, which can be inter preted as a proxy to measure CG's strategic behavior.
The data in Table 1 allows us to reach another conclusion: the error in the estimation of fiscal transfers to the ACs is not uniform across the regions. The over or underestimation effects are evenly distributed. This has to do with two different facts: i) tax autonomy is rather heterogeneous across regions, and, ii) the mechanism via which CG transfers re sources to the regions is biased against those ACs with an above-average tax capacity and below-average initial distribution of resources, because these regions receive additional re sources aimed at providing them with average per capita revenues. In 2011, CG decided that these regions would not receive any advance payment of these resources that year or in suc cessive ones and so they received the 2011 amount (t) in 2013 (t+2) and so on. Notice that for the Balearic Islands, the difference accounts for more than 2% of their GDP. This clearly affects the capacity of some ACs when trying to accurately predict their revenues, especially those mentioned in group ii) of this paragraph.
There is another technicality that must be considered. In 2010, CG introduced some reforms to consumer taxes (VAT and excise duties) which increased the tax revenues associ ated with them. However, CG did not transfer any additional resources to the ACs, even though these are shared taxes. The procedure used by CG to estimate tax revenues is not available to the ACs. Given that tax revenues may vary due to changes in each region's eco nomic position or increases in tax rates, ACs cannot disentangle whether CG's estimates are Notes: A positive value shows that at period t, CG underestimated the revenues to be transferred to the RGs. These resources are transferred at t+2.
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The Determinants of Regional Budget Forecast Errors in Federal Economies: Spain 1995-2013 correct or not. This is also very relevant when it comes to AC forecasts of revenues from own taxes, because the ACs may try to offset any underestimated revenues (real or not) from shared taxes by CG by overestimating revenues from own taxes.
Altogether, this data suggests that CG might transfer part of its deficit to the ACs by underestimating the resources that the regions should receive for period t and transferring the difference to t+2, hence creating significant difficulties when it comes to budget forecasts by the ACs.
Finally, attention must be paid to the ACs' effective responsibilities. In Spain, CG estab lishes the minimum amount of public goods and services that the ACs must provide their citizens with, and so the ACs do not have total autonomy in managing them. This means that CG can force the ACs to provide additional public services at their expense during current fiscal year t, which are very likely not budgeted for.
Special financing facilities provided during 2012 and 2013.
During the period 2009-2012 in most regions, regional government's expenditure far exceeded those forecasted. This meant that an enormous amount of expenditure (part of it with budget support -although revenue forecast proved to be too optimistic-, part of with off-budget) could not be paid. In order to avoid consequences of regional governments' pro viders the Central Government constituted different financing facilities, with an interest rate below that in the market, aimed at providing additional resources to regional governments. These additional revenues, although in the form of debt, allowed to find resources at a low cost. However, this also introduced two negative effects on Regional Governments' behav iours. First, these facilities introduced the sensation of a bail-out, hence inducing overestima tion of revenues and underestimation of expenditures expecting new financing facilities to be approved at period t+1. Second, the budgetary treatment of these revenues induced regions to increase budget expenditure at period t for which there was not effective cash. Hence, these facilities had a direct impact on budget forecasts.
We intend to capture their effects by introducing a dummy for each year 2012 and 2013.
Methodology and explanatory variables
We estimate the following structural model:
(2) RFE = a EFE + X' a + ¡ it 0 it 2,it 1 it 102 xisco oliver rullán and joan rosselló villalonga Where EFE is the expenditure forecast error and RFE stands for the revenue forecast error. The error is defined as the difference between the forecast and the real value in relative terms. Therefore, a positive value indicates that the forecast is greater than the real value. Expenditure is the sum of budget items, excluding chapter 5. Revenue includes all the items except those corresponding to chapter 5 and 8 5 . X' and X' are exogenous explanatory vari 1 2 ables that include: political variables and institutional variables (i refers to the AC and t refers to the fiscal year). u and ¡ are the error terms.
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We must be aware that Parliament approves an initial budget which is balanced. OLS would not be a suitable procedure due to endogenous causality between EFE and RFE. A balanced budget can be achieved, for instance, by overestimating revenues to finance real expenditure levels or by underestimating expenditures adjusted to real revenues, or both. We solve this problem via three-stage least squares (3SLS) as introduced by Zellner and Theil (1962) . The endogenous explanatory variable is the dependent variable from the other equa tion in the system. This is equivalent to estimating instrumental variable regressions for equations 1 and 2, assuming that disturbances u and ¡ are independent. However, we allow it it for correlation between the disturbances with a view to improved efficiency, thus estimating a Seemly Unrelated Regression model (SURE).
In addition to endogeneity, we should also take into account any possible persistence in forecast errors and we incorporate the endogenous variable with a one-period lag.
As an alternative option, we adapt equations (1) and (2) (based on aggregate data) to data based on budget items. The estimations of equations (3) and (4) attempt to find out which factors best explain the forecast errors in each budget item.
(3) R Re vItem = γ EFE + X ' + ε j it , for j j = , , , , , , 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 , and 9 j j,0 it 2,itγ j,1 , In relevant literature, the explanatory variables can be grouped into two categories. On the one hand, there are macroeconomic factors, such as interest rates, asset prices, inflation, economic cycles, etc. On the other, there are political and institutional factors, such as the composition of governments (majority governments as opposed to coalitions), the existence of budgetary institutions, the role of political business cycles, partisanship, etc.
In the first group, economic factors are considered. When variables related to the eco nomic cycle (the GDP, interest rates, inflation, asset prices, etc.) are used as explanatory variables, this might have an impact on budget forecasts. GDP forecast errors are expected to have an impact on budget forecasts of items such as social expenditure or tax revenues.
Unfortunately, this data is not available for each AC because some of them do not present GDP growth estimates. However, we use two variables to capture economic factors. First, AC growth rate captures the cyclical component of the forecast error. Second, we included a variable to measure the difference between the Central Government's forecasted economic growth rate on which its budget is based and the real economic growth.
The second group of variables relate to political factors. Political instability, ideologies and electoral cycles are expected to have an impact on budget forecast errors. As an ex planatory variable, we introduced Political Concurrence, defined as the concurrence (or not) in the ideologies of CG and the ACs' governing parties (taking a value of 1 if there is a concurrence and 0 otherwise). We expected CG to favor ACs with governing parties of the same ideology by transferring more resources to them or by financing their capital expendi ture, while ACs of other ideologies might have to finance capital expenditure with their own resources, thus tending to overestimate them. Another political variable is the ACs' political orientation. In it is commonly expected, in the literature of the political economy of fiscal deficits that left-wing governing parties take less care in meeting budget targets than right wing parties (Eslava, 2011) . However, no expectations are made concerning nationalist par ties.
Finally, there is a third group of variables relating to institutional factors, as in Sansó (2016) and Lago Peñas, Fernández Leiceaga and Vaquero (2016) . We argue that the existence of institutions that are responsible for monitoring budgets does not guarantee compliance with fiscal rules or coordination among different levels of governments. As we explained in footnote 4, in Spain there is a budgetary institution that, unexpectedly, tends to foster institutional disloyalty (López-Casasnovas and Rosselló 2014) rather than fiscal coor dination. Two different groups of variables are incorporated to take into account institu tional factors. We tried to go beyond the use of the typical variables for defining levels of decentralization, tax autonomy, etc., and we computed new variables that take into consid eration some of the technicalities involved in the fiscal relationships between CG and the ACs detailed in section 4.
On the one hand, we introduced three variables associated with the potential strategic behaviors of CG and the ACs. First, we incorporated the ratio between the public debt of each AC's public bodies and its GDP. Our argument is that the fiscal rules on RGs can be circumvented by diverting the AC's fiscal deficit to its public bodies. In Spain, this ex plains why there has been an enormous increase in such public bodies and their debt. It is often the case that when CG introduces additional restrictions on such entities, the ACs (also the CG itself) create new bodies with a different legal status. Thus a negative sign is expected for this variable. Second, we introduced CG's budget deficit. We argue that CG can be tempted to correct its deficit by transferring it to the ACs. We introduced one lag in this variable due to the process with which the budget is drawn up. A positive sign was expected for this variable, which means the larger CG's budget deficit, the more tempted it will be to transfer it to the ACs (through financing arrangements or by changing the al location of deficit targets during fiscal year t). We introduced one lag for this variable. 104 xisco oliver rullán and joan rosselló villalonga Alternatively, it might be argued that this is an endogenous variable because CG may fail in its deficit target, since it might be forced to increase the amount of resources channeled into reducing the ACs' budget deficits. However, financing agreements between CG and the ACs prevent this from occurring because CG unilaterally controls the process via which the ACs receive their financial resources, together with the allocation of deficit tar gets at an inter and intra-governmental level. In addition, since 2012, CG has controlled the evolution of expenditure by the ACs and it can impose restrictions on it. Third, we include AC's budget deficit/surplus at t-1 in order to analyze if positive (or negative) bal ance could imply larger forecast errors at period t.
On the other hand, we also introduced some variables relating to the financing agree ments between CG and the ACs that determine the total amount of financial resources to be received by the latter. We argue that these financing agreements do have an impact on the ACs' degree of tax autonomy and that this has an impact on their budget forecasts. In this group of variables, we included the total per capita resources available to each AC. This variable is measured by taking the estimated revenues from own taxes, shared taxes and CG transfers to the ACs at period t, plus the compensation received by the ACs at t+2 due to the difference between their estimated revenues and effective revenues. We also introduced a dummy variable in order to capture the specificity of each financing agree ment (FA1 -1992 -1996 -, FA2 -1997 /2001 -, FA3 -2002 /2008 -and FA4 -2009 /2013 . From a formal point of view, the renewal of the financing agreements has tended to increase the degree of tax autonomy, which indicates that this variable might be interpreted as a proxy for tax autonomy. In addition, we introduced two different direct measures of tax autonomy. The first one was the ratio between the total transfers (including those from the EU) and total non-financial revenues. The second one was the ratio between the total revenue from own taxes (plus income tax, which is a shared tax and can be regulated by the ACs to a slight extent) and non-financial revenues. We have no expectations regarding the sign of these variables because while some authors suggest that a greater degree of tax autonomy should lead to more responsible behaviour (e.g. adjusting public expenditure to the achievement of revenue forecasts) by the ACs (in which case a positive sign would be expected for FA1, FA2 and FA3 as opposed to FA4), others argue that with more tax au tonomy, the ACs' revenues largely depend on the evolution of the tax base which is very difficult to forecast), while the ACs' expenditure is rather structural.
Results
In Table 2 , we present the summary statistics. The average expenditure and revenue forecast error is negative. The public sector debt -that corresponding only to public firms and other public institutions-represents around 0.48% of the GDP during the whole period of analysis. Another interesting datum is that for almost half the years, there is political concur rence between CG and the ACs' governing parties and that for 20% of the total years, there is a nationalist party in power.
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The Determinants of Regional Budget Forecast Errors in Federal Economies: Spain 1995 -2013 In Table 3 , the first two columns present the OLS estimation of expenditure and revenue forecast errors, considering each variable to be exogenous in the other equation. Columns 3 and 4 present the 3SLS estimation, considering endogeneity in both dependent variables. Columns 5 and 6 consider the role of the endogenous variable, lagged one period 6 . One initial result to be noted is that even though OLS estimates are inconsistent in terms of en dogeneity, when each equation is individually estimated without using instruments, the re sults are similar to those of the structural estimation. In particular, the results suggest that there is a strong relationship between revenue and expenditure forecast errors, although we cannot provide any results on the direction of the causality. Furthermore, the results indicate that the size of the public sector debt has a negative effect on expenditure forecast errors; that is, the larger the public debt, the lower the expenditure forecast errors. Our interpretation is that the expenditure forecast errors are lower because regional governments tend to transfer part of the expenditure not contemplated in the budget to their public sector, with softer rules 106 xisco oliver rullán and joan rosselló villalonga on the execution of their budgets. In contrast, revenue forecast errors are positively affected by the size of the public sector debt (although we cannot test whether these revenues are over or underestimated). Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0. 001. s.e. in brackets. Years: 1996 001. s.e. in brackets. Years: -2013 Results also suggest that budget forecasts errors are clearly influenced by AC's growth rates: we observe that while economic growth plays a positive role on expenditure forecast errors (reducing them), it increases revenue forecast errors. Finally, we find that when the Central Government overestimates national economic growth this has a negative impact on expenditure forecast errors and a positive impact on revenue forecast errors (meaning larger revenue forecast errors). Meanwhile, previous deficit/surplus seems not to be relevant. How ever, previous deficit/surplus do not have an impact on forecast errors in our estimations.
Finally, it seems that institutional and political variables do not influence forecast errors, except for the estimates whose endogenous variables have a one-period lag, when political con currence is significant (with the opposite sign from revenue and expenditure forecast errors).
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In Tables 4 and 5 , we estimate revenue and expenditure forecast errors using all forecast errors by budget item as endogenous variables. In particular, we use the weight of the error for each expenditure item as an explanatory variable in the revenue forecast error equation. The weighted sum of the errors in each expenditure item is the total expenditure forecast error. The same is true for the total revenue forecast error.
The estimates in the first column of Table 4 indicate that all the forecast errors in all the expenditure budget items have a positive effect on revenue forecast errors. We observe that ACs' economic growth rates and deviations from real economic growth with respect to fore casted economic growth estimated by the Central Government, do have a positive impact on revenue forecast errors (larger growth implies larger revenue forecast errors).
As for the estimates for each of the expenditure budget items (columns 2-8) shown in Table 4 , the results are different for each item. First, the bigger the revenue forecast errors, the larger the budget forecast errors for public employees (cap1), supplies (cap2), transfers (cap4), and investment (cap6). Secondly, the forecast errors for four expenditure budget items seem to be influenced by political variables. On the one hand, when the parties in power in Central and Regional government share the same ideology, this has positive impact on forecast errors in public employees (cap1) and interest payments (cap3). On the other hand, forecast errors in these two items are higher in the case of regional governments ruled by nationalist parties. Another interesting result is the fact that left-wing governing parties tend to make smaller forecast errors in public employees' wages (cap1) compared to right wing parties, but larger forecast errors in interest payments (cap 3). Results show also that per capita revenues from financing agreements have a positive effect on forecast errors in interest payments (cap3), public investment (cap6), transfers to other administrations or private agents (cap4) and procurement (cap2). Finally, we must remark that both ACs' growth rates and forecast errors in aggregate GDP do have a negative impact on forecast errors in interest payments (cap3) and transfers (cap4).
Finally, the estimates in the first column of Table 5 indicate that forecast errors in all the revenue budget items have a positive effect on expenditure forecast errors. Again, the size of the public sector debt and national GDP forecast errors by the CG have a negative effect on expenditure forecast errors. None of the other explanatory variables displays significant co efficients.
Forecast revenue estimates for each revenue budget items provide the following results: First, the forecast errors in direct taxation (IIDD, mainly income and property taxes), are not explained by any of the variables under consideration; second, expenditure forecast errors seem to have a significant positive impact on forecast errors in indirect taxation (IIII, mainly VAT and excise taxes). This is a little unexpected given that these revenues are computed and decided by CG, not by RGs. Third, the public sector debt has different effects on the budget revenue items: larger public sector debt levels cause larger forecast errors in revenues fees and public prices (Tax), while the opposite is true in the case of forecast errors in revenues from transfers from other administrations (TTCA). Fourth, tax autonomy measured as trans 
REVENUE FORECAST ERROR. 3SLS (THREE-STAGE ESTIMATION FOR SYSTEMS OF SIMULTANEOUS EQUATIONS)
The Determinants of Regional Budget Forecast Errors in Federal Economies: Spain 1995 -2013 Political variables also play a role in explaining revenue forecast errors because re gional governments ruled by nationalist parties display lower forecast errors in revenues from fees (Tax) and Transfers (TTCA), while the opposite is true for forecast errors in rev enues from indirect taxation (IIII).
Finally, unexpectedly, the CG deficit lagged one period has a negative impact on revenue forecasts from fees (Tax), while the CG deficit has a positive impact on revenue transfers forecast errors.
Conclusions
In this paper, we intended to test the relevance of political and institutional variables in explaining revenue and expenditure budget forecast errors.
The results suggest that estimates based on aggregate expenditure and revenue budget data are driven by the causality of expenditure forecast errors on revenue forecast errors and vice versa, which makes it difficult to disentangle the direction of the causality and makes the role of the other variables almost irrelevant.
The results also indicate that the public sector debt plays a role in explaining forecast errors. This variable is significant when the estimates refer to the aggregate budget or to budget items. However, the sign of this relationship differs depending on whether we refer to expenditure or revenue forecast errors. It could be inferred that the ACs use their public sector to circumvent tough fiscal rules imposed by CG.
As regards the role played by institutional and political variables, the results indicate that they play no role at all when aggregate expenditure and revenue forecast errors are estimated. Nevertheless, tax autonomy, political concurrence, the ruling parties' political orientation and per capita revenue from financing agreements do have some explanatory power when the estimates are based on budget items. This suggests that budget managers may use budget forecasts to balance policy needs against fiscal rules and that they behave strategically using the electoral calendar, tax autonomy and budget rules at their convenience. 116 xisco oliver rullán and joan rosselló villalonga In further research, it is important to test whether the explanatory variables lead to the underestimation or overestimation of revenues and expenditures, because this paper did not explore the sign of the forecast error. Dummy variable,1= if a nationalist party is ruling the Regional Govern ment, 0=otherwise
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Resumen
El trabajo pretende comprobar la relevancia de variables políticas e institucionales para explicar las desviaciones de los gastos e ingresos liquidados respecto a los presupuestados. Los resultados, basados en el gasto agregado e ingreso agregado, indican que las estimaciones son resultado de la causalidad entre las desviaciones de los gastos sobre los ingresos y viceversa, lo que hace imposible discernir la dirección de la causalidad. Los resultados también señalan que la deuda del sector público, así como otras variables institucionales, juegan un papel importante para explicar los errores de predicción. La robustez de los coeficientes depende de si las estimaciones se basan en valores agregados en vez de los capítulos del presupuesto.
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